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I Mainstreaming Conflict in
Development*
Violent conflict is without doubt one of the biggest
barriers to sustainable development globally (see
for example OECD DAC 1996; Luckham et al.
1999). It is also a major obstacle towards the
achievement of the International Development
Targets (IDTs).' Violent conflict inhibits progress
on all of the IDTs by affecting the proportion of
people living in extreme poverty, inhibiting
progress on 'human development targets' and
affecting environmental sustainability and the
achievement of the regeneration target (Luckham et
aI. 1999; Fitzgerald and Stewart 1997).
In recent years there has been a plethora of new
initiatives announced at multilateral, bilateral, and
regional levels to address conflict. This
'international response' has sought particularly to
address concerns about the rising trend of conflict
in Africa (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Bigombe
et al. 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; De Waal
2000).
Between 1980 and 1994 ten of the twenty-four
most war-affected countries were African, and four
of these (Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and
Somalia) were ranked within the five most severely
affected countries in the world (Luckham et al.
1999). In 1998 Kofi Annan in his report to the
United Nations (UN) Security Council on 'The
causes of conflict and the promotion of durable
peace and sustainable development in Africa',
observed that 'In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53
countries of Africa were afflicted by armed
conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-
related deaths worldwide and resulting in more
than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced
persons. The consequences of those conflicts have
seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure
long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its
peoples.' More recently the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute noted that
'... Africa is the most conflict-ridden region of the
world and the only region in which armed conflict
is on the increase.' (SIPRI 1999). Currently more
than half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are
engaged in or affected by conflict. The results have
been devastating and include: problems of
recurring humanitarian crises; genocidal wars;
senseless plunder; the recruitment of child soldiers;
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the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
the ever-rising numbers of refugees and displaced
persons; the tragic victims of landmines; the
destruction of infrastructure; the erosion of human
development and environmental destruction.
The scale of the problems has forced the
international community to seek new initiatives to
deal with the symbiotic challenge of Africa security
and development dilemmas. This international
response has been driven partly by public concerns
following the failure of the international community
to intervene in Rwanda to prevent genocide. It is
worth noting also that this response has been
developed against a backdrop of public concerns in
industrialised countries about the waste of
development assistance provided to war-ravaged
countries, especially in Africa.2
So what are these new initiatives' and to what
extent are they likely to succeed? A summary of
the main initiatives reveals the following.
2 Multilateral Initiatives
2.1 The United Nations
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the
international community supported ambitious
peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives in Africa.
This brought some significant successes (Namibia
and Mozambique). Elsewhere, however, success in
UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has proved
illusive. The UNs inability to restore peace in
Somalia in the early 1990s (culminating in the
Security CouncilS unprecedented response of
withdrawing before the completion of its mission)
soured international support for intervention in
conflict zones and precipitated a rapid retreat by the
international community from peacekeeping
worldwide. One consequence of this was the failure
of the international community to prevent genocide
in Rwanda.
In the face of deteriorating conditions the
international community has reluctantly been
forced to rethink its policies towards conflict in
Africa. Kofi Annan, commenting on the
international communities inertia towards conflict
in Africa, commented that 'We have failed them by
not adequately addressing the causes of conflict; by
not doing enough to ensure peace; and by our
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repeated inability to create the conditions for
sustainable development. This is the reality of
Africa's recent past' (Annan 1998). In his 1998
report to the Security Council, the Secretary-
General proposed four main types of action to
prevent or reduce violent conflicts in Africa:
(a) Peacemaking
More effective coordination and preparation
required;
Rival mediation efforts to be avoided;
Establishment of 'contact groups' to mobilise
peace efforts;
Sanctions targeted at decision-makers and their
families - including freezing of assets and
restrictions on travel;
Restriction of arms exports to conflict zones.
(b) Peacekeeping
Of the thirty-two UN peacekeeping operations
launched since 1989, thirteen have been in
Africa (more than in any other region of the
world);
Peace-building elements to be integrated into
the mandate of PKOs;
Recognition of the greater potential role for
preventive deployment;
Reinforcing Africa's own capacity to mount
peacekeeping missions.
(c) Humanitarian assistance
Adherence to international humanitarian and
human rights norms in UNS work;
Improved coordination of UN humanitarian
actions;
Humanitarian assistance not to be treated as a
substitute for political action.
(d) Post-conflict peace building
Post-conflict reconstruction to be timely,
multifaceted and adequately financed with high
level strategic and administrative coordination;
Where economic reforms are required, 'peace-
friendly' structural adjustment programmes
together with easing of conditionality necessary;
Improved coordination in post-conflict peace-
building.
In the past year, the Secretary-General commiss-
ioned a substantial review of progress on much of
this work, led by the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations. The recommendations of the Panel are
contained in the Brahimi Report. The key
recommendations of particular relevance to
development agencies include:
Endorsement of the Secretary-General's appeal
to ail those who are engaged in conflict
prevention and development; the United
Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions,
governments and civil society organisations to
address challenges in a more integrated fashion';
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
to take a key coordinating role in post conflict
situations;
A doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police,
other rule of law elements and human rights
experts to increase focus on strengthening the
rule of law and improving respect for human
rights;
Executive Committee on Peace and Security to
recommend a plan to strengthen the permanent
capacity of the UN to develop peace-building
strategies and implement support programmes;
The Department for Peace-Keeping Operations
to formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy
for peace operations, outlining the use of UN
volunteers;
Establishment of integrated mission task forces
with members seconded from throughout the
UN;
Support for the creation of a peace-building
unit;
The procurement, logistics etc. for smaller non-
military field missions to be provided by the
United Nations Office for Project Services
(UNOPS);
A substantial enhancement of the field mission
planning and preparation capacity of the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR).
The Brahimi Report highlights the fact that there are
major questions about the ability of the UN to
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deliver on conflict prevention/peacekeeping. It
signals the importance of closing the gap between
high-level policy statements and reality in the field.
Much will now depend on how its recommend-
ations are implemented.
2.2 TheG8
In recent years the G8 has made numerous
pronouncements in support of specific initiatives
on conflict prevention and non-proliferation/arms
controls. In the December 1999 G8 Foreign
Ministers Meeting, five issues were identified for
action: small arms; development and conflict; the
illicit trade in diamonds; the targeting of children in
conflict, and civilian policing.
In July 2000 at Miyazaki, G8 ministers endorsed
several measures, including: dealing with the
uncontrolled and illegal transfer of small arms and
light weapons; addressing the illicit trade in
diamonds; ensuring that development policies are
constructed so as to contribute to the elimination of
potential causes of armed conflicts; addressing the
impact of armed conflict on children
The willingness of the G8 to follow up on this
agenda remains unclear. The next summit takes
place in Italy in Spring 2001 and it will be
interesting to see what, if any, action results.
Perhaps the most likely areas of follow up action
will be on the extension of highly indebted poor
countries (l-IIPC) debt relief for post-conflict
countries and more coordinated action by the G8 to
stop the proliferation of small arms and illicit
weapons.
2.3 The World Bank
In the past few years the Bank has established a
Post-Conflict Unit dedicated to easing the transition
to sustainable peace and supporting socio-
economic development in conflict-affected
countries (Colletta et al. 1998). This aims to address
needs such as the social reintegration of displaced
and ex-combatants, community reconciliation,
reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure,
and institutional development.
The Bank is developing tools for financing in
countries that are not eligible for standard
International Development Assistance (IDA)
lending. New financing tools include the Post-
Conflict Program Grants, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Grants,
and learning and innovation loans. The Post-
Conflict Fund supports planning, piloting and
analysis of reconstruction activities. The World
Bank also has a key role in mobilising post-conflict
finance through Consultative Group meetings
(Colletta 1998).
In practice the majority of Bank support in post-
conflict situations is for the rehabilitation of
infrastructure, which it perceives to be to its
comparative advantage. Perhaps the key issues in
the next period on which we are likely to see
progress by the Bank are on Country Assistance
Strategies and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. If
PRSPs begin to address the underlying structural
causes of conflict and social exclusion, and the
Bank is able to assist fragile government policy
structures to develop coherent cross-sectoral
poverty reduction strategies, we may begin to see a
major reduction globally in the spread of violent
conflict.
2.4 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF)
The IMP has largely focused on restoration of
macro-economic balance in post-conflict countries.
The IMF recognises the role it can play in 'catalysing
balance of payments support from the international
community within an appropriate macro-economic
framework', it is however keen to avoid a flagship
role in supporting countries in post-conflict
situations. The key role for the IMF is likely to be to
assist in co-ordinating integrated investment in post
conflict countries. Debates about a more
appropriate role in post-conflict reconstruction
have focused on 'Marshall type interventions' as
opposed to pure market orientated strategies in
politically sensitive 'transition processes'.4
2.5 The European Community
Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
are important aspects of the new Cotonou
Agreement between the European Community (EC)
and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The
FC Africa Working Group has been active in
supporting conflict prevention and peace-building
and the EC has also provided practïcal support to
conflict resolution and DDR programmes in the
Horn of Africa. Conflict prevention and
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peacekeeping is also likely to be a high priority
under the Swedish presidency in 2001
The establishment of the Rapid Reaction Facility
(RRF) as part of the Common European Security
and Defence Policy has potential implications for
conflict-related work in Africa. The RRF is designed
to enhance the European Unions capacity to
intervene fast and effectively in crisis points outside
the EU, to mobilise resources within hours or days
rather than weeks or months. The RRF will be used
to support: human rights work; election
monitoring; institution building; media support;
border management; humanitarian missions; de-
mining operations; police training and the
provision of police equipment; civil emergency
assistance; rehabilitation; reconstruction; pacific-
ation; resettlement and mediation.
3 Bilateral Programming
Initiatives
In addition to the multilateral initiatives mentioned
above, many governments are involved in
supporting specific bilateral programming
initiatives.6 For Africa, some of the most important
of these are as follows:
USA - Major peacekeeping training programme
(the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRO).
Involves expenditure of approximately $20
million annually and expending $75 million
since its inception in 1997. ACRI's battalion and
command-post training are intended to increase
African capacity to participate in Chapter VI
peacekeeping.7 Initially eight countries were
involved in the ACRI, including Benin, Cote
d'Ivore, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal
and Uganda (though the programmes in
Ethiopia and Uganda were later suspended
because of hostilities between Ethiopia and
Eritrea and because of Ugandds involvement in
the Democratic Republic of Congo). Nigeria's
involvement in ACRI has been a more recent
phenomenon.
France - As part of its revised Africa policy,
France has significantly reduced its deployment
of troops and military advisers in Africa. Its
budget for military cooperation has also been
reduced since 1997. As part of changes in
FrancoAfrican relations, France has supported
a new security assistance policy 'renforcement
des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix
(RECAMP). The initiative has three main
pillars: instruction; sub-regional peacekeeping
training exercises; and pre-positioning
equipment in designated locations in Africa.
RECAMP is viewed more as a concept rather
than a programme. RECAMP does not have a
firm annual budget. Franc&s main African
partners in RECAMP include Cote d'lvore, Mali,
Senegal and Togo. Other countries involved in
RECAMP training programmes include Ghana,
Cape Verde, Gambia, Gabon, Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau.
Norway - Strong support for conflict resolution
and peace-building activities has focused
largely on the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) sub-region. The
Norwegian Government is financing an
ambitious five-year Training for Peace (TfP) in
Southern Africa that aims to build capacity for
conflict management and peacekeeping. More
than 250 officials from governments,
representatives of defence and police forces and
members of civil society have participated in
TIP workshops. Norway also provides support
for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and for the
Programme for Coordination and Assistance for
Security Development (PCASED), which plays
a key role in the implementation of the
Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) moratorium on the production,
import and export of small arms and light
weapons. Norway has also provided voluntary
funds to a number of UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa.
Sweden - Has provided US$136,877 annually to
the OAU Peace Fund in 1998 and 1999.
Sweden also supports work with the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) and PCASED and provides support for
training and field exercises. In addition, a key
component of Sweden work on conflict
prevention concerns its support to civil society
projects. Sweden has also contributed to UN
peacekeeping operations in Africa.
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Denmariz - Extensive engagement in
peacekeeping training, particularly in Southern
Africa. In 1995 Denmark undertook an
assessment of the existing capacity of the
Southern Africa region and identified the need
for a regional centre and clearing house for
peacekeeping training. In 1997 the Regional
Peace Training Centre was established with
Danish funding (US$2.7 million over three
years). Its aim is to organise and finance ten
peacekeeping courses over a three-year period
and to provide short- and long-term technical
advisers. In addition to voluntary financial
contributions to a number of UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa, Denmark has also
contributed to the OAU Peace Fund.
Canada - Has identified participation in
peacekeeping as a central part of its foreign and
defence policies and has deployed its own
troops to UN-authorised operations in Africa.
Canada has also contributed to peacekeeping
training (through its Military Training
Assistance Programme). Canada has also
supported sub-regional training initiatives and
contributed to the OAU Peace Fund. In the past
year Canada has provided US$700,000 in non-
lethal material support for Ghanaian and
Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone. Canada has
also focused on children affected by war as part
of its overall approach.
Japan - Has organised several conferences and
symposia that address the issue of developing
Afrïcan peacekeeping capabilities. Japan has
made significant financial contributions,
through the UN and African regional
organisations, to peacekeeping in Africa
(including voluntary financial contributions for
peace operations). In the past year Japan has
established a Toast Fund with the UN called 'the
Sub-account for the Trust Fund in support of
Special Mission and other activities related to
Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping'. The
aim of this now appears in part to include
follow-up action on the G8 initiatives.
South Africa - Considerable potential both at
governmental and civil society level, to
contribute to conflict prevention in Africa.
The Establishment of the Joint Pools for Conflict Prevention in the UK
The UK has supported the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme funded to the
tune of roughly US $4 million per annum since 1996. A central goal of this programme has
been to help develop national military staff colleges into 'centres of excellence' for regional
peacekeeping training through the Military Advisory and Training Teams. Some of this work
is currently being reviewed.
The UI< has also provided material and logistical support to African contingents preparing to
deploy to peacekeeping operations and has played a prominent role in security sector reform
in many countries.
A major new initiative in the past year has been the 'Cross-cutting reviews on conflict
prevention'. These recommend ways in which government departments could improve the
UKS contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention and management by working more
closely together.
In July 2000 two sub-committees of the Cabinet Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy
were established. One of the sub-committees is chaired by the Secretary of State for
International Development and addresses the government's priorities and programmes for
conflict prevention in sub-Saharan Africa. The other, chaired by the Foreign Secretary, fulfils
the same role in relation to the rest of the world.
The aim of these new measures is to reduce violent conflict by improving the effectiveness,
impact and efficiency of the government's contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention
and management. The new arrangements entail the production of a cross-departmental joint
strategy to facilitate collective decision-making and improve the effectiveness, impact and
efficiency of the government's contribution to peacekeeping, conflict prevention and
management. A joint pool has been established for sub-Saharan Africa, harnessing the
resources that each department currently devotes to conflict prevention in the region, together
with additional resources from treasury
These new arrangements come into effect in April 2001
South Africa intends to increase peacekeeping
capacity in SADC. However, suspicions about
South Africa's hegemonie intentions mean that
there is a continuing need to build trust and
confidence with other members of SADC.°
4 Regional and Sub-Regional
Initiatives (in Africa)
In 1990 the OAU heads of state and government
rededicated themselves to work together towards
the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts.'0
The declaration sought to put Africa at the centre of
all attempts at dealing with conflicts, by
emphasising that Africa, while welcoming the
sympathy, understanding and assistance of others,
84
also recognises that it is the primary responsibility
of African governments to act, before all others, to
tackle the phenomenon of conflicts.
In June 1993 the OAU established a Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.
The mechanisms aims are to anticipate and prevent
conflicts. An OAU Peace Fund has also been
established to support its operational activities.
Since its inception, the mechanism has undertaken
a number of initiatives inRwanda, Burundi, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and the
Democratic Republic of Congo aimed at defusing
tensions. The OAU has also played an active role in
mediating between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Like many of the other efforts, overall the OAU has
not been especially effective in its role in preventing
and resolving conflicts in Africa. Political and
bureaucratic difficulties have meant that the OAU
mechanisms for conflict management have
remained relatively weak and under-resourced.
Nevertheless, the OAU will surely continue to play
an important political role in conflict resolution in
Africa in future.
Sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS,
SADC and IGAD are all fairly weak. They are all
currently involved in work on preventing the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, but
in general have limited capacity to support conflict
prevention and dispute resolution.
ECOWAS has a Standing Mediation Committee to
mediate in disputes between member states. The
large number of conflicts in West Africa in the past
decade suggests that the ECOWAS mechanisms are
not particularly effective. A number of factions have
emerged within ECOWAS, partly as a
counterweight to the dominant role of Nigeria in
the region.
Within SADC there has also been discussion about
regional peacekeeping and conflict prevention in
recent years. The rivalry between South Africa and
Zimbabwe has been a key factor affecting SADCs
role in conflict prevention and peacekeeping (for
example in the Democratic Republic of Congo). The
lack of an effective secretariat has also limited
SADC capacity to be a more effective player on
conflict prevention and peace-building.
IGAD is also weak as a result of the fragile peace
between several of its members (for example
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti). IGAD
also has limited capacity (a small secretariat) to play
a more prominent role.
In bringing together the various types and levels of
institutional responses to address conflict issues,
various contributions of 'non-state actors' need to
be born in mind, including: religious organisations
- in particular the churches; non-governmental
organisations; and security and private military
companies. Non-state actors contribute to conflict
prevention in Africa in a variety of ways. They are
often able to work in areas occupied by rebel
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groups and have greater scope for action in conflict
areas. One of the main contributions of NGOs in
particular lies in their ability to work in areas
occupied by rebel groups and their greater access to
and experience of operating in conflict areas. Non-
state actors often have extensive experience of
operating in conflict areas and a considerable depth
of understanding of the dynamics of conflict on the
ground."
5 Conclusion
In summary it is interesting to note that there are
probably more instïtutions now than ever before
involved in responding to violent conflicts. In part
this is perhaps in recognition of the failure of
previous institutional responses to deal with the
changing nature and scale of warfare. One might
conclude that there has been substantial progress
achieved at policy level in 'mainstreaming conflict
issues' (OECD 1998). With few exceptions, key
development agencies are now beginning to get
more engaged in responding to conflict issues as
part of their programmes. This is in marked
contrast to much of the 1980s, when a relatively
small group of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), academics and practitioners were
advocating for conflict to be given a higher priority
in the work of official aid agencies. To what extent,
however, has this actually resulted in improved
practical outcomes?
Given the time-lags between the announcement of
new policies and their implementation, realistically
it may be too soon to judge outcomes. Indeed, one
might argue that many of the policy pronounce-
ments have yet to be backed by resources (financial
and human) made available to support the policy
shifts mentioned above.
A key theme running through all the major
initiatives, however, has been the emphasis on the
need for improved coordination and complem-
entary action. Thïs was highlighted in the OECD
Development Assistance Committees Guidelines on
Peace, Development and Co-operation which state:
While concentrating on fields of action in
which it has a comparative advantage,
development co-operation can also work with
other instruments; including diplomatic,
military and economic ones, to strengthen the
possibilities of peace and development. (OECD
1997)
A closer analysis of the various institutional
responses in the past few years shows in fact that
there has been little analysis of how each of the
initiatives fits together and how they complement
others.
Improving coordination and 'complementarity' is
complex.'3 It entails a sharing of information, goals
and assessment methods between agencies - an area
that has proved notoriously difficult because of
different political and institutional agendas (Uvin
1999; Macrae and Leader 2000). An example of this
is the fact that there are currently fourteen different
peacekeeping training initiatives being supported in
Africa alone, entailing considerable duplication of
efforts and ineffective use of resources.
Improving the possibilities for complementary
action' also requires concerted action across
geographical boundaries, including mechanisms for
regular consultation and exchange of information.
This applies both within an institution and between
agencies (for example between field- and
headquarters-based staff or staff from different
countries or between field operations of different
agencies across neighbouring countries)
Effective complimentary action also requires the
sharing of information, goals and assessment
methods across disciplines (within and between
agencies).
Finally, effective complementary action requires
timely access to resources and the availability of
resources specifically earmarked for 'coordination
purposes'.
Progress on overcoming these fairly 'basic
constraints' is bound to be difficult, but may lie at
the heart of creating more effective strategies for
conflict prevention, resolution and management.
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Notes
* I am indebted to my colleagues Debi Duncan and
John Goodhand for drawing my attention to the
distinctions between donor approaches to conflict.
They distinguish between policies that involve:
working around conflict; working in conflict; and
working on conflict.
The views and opinions expressed in this article
are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Department of International Development.
The IDTs were agreed in a series of world conferences
organised by the United Nations in the 1990s. They
aim to assist measuring progress in development. The
targets reflect broad agreement in the international
community, and are arrived at with the active
participation of developing countries, which leads to
the steps needed to promote economic well-being,
social development and environmental sustainability
and regeneration. Violent conflict inhibits progress
on all of the IDTs. This was specifically referred to in
the UN Secretary-General's speech to the UN
Millennium Summit, 'We the Peoples: The Role of the
United Nations in the 21st Century', see
http:IIwww.un.org/millennium/sglreportlsumm.htm
It is instructive to see the difference between the
international communities' response to conflict and
humanitarian crisis in Africa and similar situations in
Southern Europe. For example, there appears to be
relatively little public questioning of the costs or the
waste associated with the war in Kosovo, despite the
fact that it was a very expensive and poorly
implemented intervention.
See for example the Communiqué of the G8 Foreign
Ministers Meeting, Miyazaki, July 2000.
There has been considerable controversy about the
IMFk approach to post-conflict reconstruction. The
IMFI insistence on minimising its role to traditional
macrmeconomic stability measures has in many cases
been seen as part of the problem in highly delicate
transitionary situations: see, for example, M. Pastor
and J. Boyce, 'The political economy of complex
humanitarian emergencies: lessons from El Salvador',
World tnstitute for Development Economic Research
Working Paper, No. 131, Helsinki, April 1997; E. W
Nafziger and J. Auviren, 'War, hunger, and
displacement: an econometric investigation into the
sources of humanitarian emergencies', World Institute
for Development Economic Research Working Paper, No.
142, Helsinki, September 1997; J. Boyce and M.
Pastor 'International financial institutions and
conflict prevention: five proposals', Memorandum for
the Council on Foreign Relations Conference
Progress and Pitfalls in Preventive Action, Council for
Foreign Relations, New York, 11 December 1997.
A useful summary of the ways in which conflict
prevention relates to the Lomé framework is
provided in B. Jones and S. Prasad, 'European Union
development co-operation in the 21st century',
International Alert, 1998. See also M. Chalmers,
'Security sector reform in developing countries an EU
perspective', Saferworld/University of Bradford,
January 2000; M. Leonhardt, 'Conflict impact
assessment of EU development co-operation with
ACP countries - a review of literature and practice',
International AlertlSaferworld, 2000.
An excellent summary of the main initiatives is
provided in E. Berman and 1K. Sams, 'Peacekeeping in
Africa: capabilities and culpabilities', UN Institute for
Disarmament Research and Institute for Security
Studies,South Africa, 2000.
See, for example, Jim Fisher-Thompson, 'UN
Important to US-Africa Peacekeeping Goals, US
Official Says' (interview with ACRI special co-
ordinator, Aubrey Hooks) in Washington Eile, 11
January 2000, Office of the International Information
Programs, US Department of State.
See, for example, C. Short, speech on the UN
Millennium Summit, Chatham House, September
2000; Department for International Development
'Departmental Report 2001' (forthcoming), DEJO
2001.
There is a need to be aware of the way in which
Western powers are to some extent projecting roles
onto countries such as South Africa and Nigeria.
Peacekeeping by proxy has a very real potential to
backfire with dire consequences for conflict on the
continent. See, for example, A. Zacarias, 'The new
security thinking six years post-Apartheid: where are
we?' draft paper presented to the Conference on
Southern Africa Evolving Security Architecture:
Prospects and Problems, Gabarone, Botswana,
December 2000; A. Adebajo and C. Landberg
'Prophets of Africa's renaissance: South Africa and
Nigeria as regional hegemons', draft paper presented
to the Conference on Southern Africa Evolving
Security Architecture: Prospects and Problems,
Gabarone, Botswana, December 2000.
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See for example E.Berman and K. Sams (2000).
The kinds of roles that non-state actors play include:
analysis - early warning, human rights monitoring,
conflict and political analysis; mediation - at
community level and with irregular armed forces;
protection - identification of key groups at risk, child
protection from recruitment; peace-building -
community level and institutional reform; arms
control - community, national and regional. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a
particularly important non-state actor and through its
mandate has extensive involvement with all parties in
the majority of conflicts. Apart from its protection
role, ICRC is involved in mediation and small arms
control.
This was a point eloquently made by Professor
Ibrahim Gambari, UN Under-Secretary-General and
Special Adviser on Africa, in his keynote speech
'Africa, the United Nations and the Southern African
Development Community', at the Conference on
Southern Africa Evolving Security Architecture:
Prospects and Problems, organised by the
International Peace Academy, Gabarone, Botswana,
December 2000.
The OECD DAC in its 1998 document 'Conflict,
peace and development cooperation on the threshold
of the 21st century' notes that 'in practical terms (aid)
coordination is based on five elements: (a) a common
strategic framework for assistance; (b) timely access
to resources for flexible implementation; (e)
leadership among international actors; (d)
mechanisms for field level consultation and sharing
of information; (e) the availability of resources
specifically earmarked for coordination purposes'
(p.31). See also J. Macrae and N. Leader, 'Shifting
Sands: the search for "coherence" between political
and humanitarian responses to complex
emergencies', HPG Report, No. 8, London, Overseas
Development Institute, 2000.
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